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Abstract 
Economic integration fosters production efficiency by enhancing market 
competition, and makes it difficult for National governments to conduct 
independent fiscal policies and to enforce income redistribution schemes. 
Controlling for country‐level income variation, available data suggest that Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was associated with a small but significant 
increase in disposable income inequality, reflecting less generous social policies.  
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1.Introduction 
Much has been written about the macroeconomic, trade, and productivity implications of economic 
and monetary integration.1 An extensive if somewhat inconclusive body of theoretical and empirical 
work has dealt with interactions between economic integration and income inequality within and 
across countries.2 But as the early stages of the European process of economic integration focused on 
deregulation and production efficiency, little attention has been paid by researchers to inequality 
issues in the context of the European economic and monetary union experience. Policies that 
redistribute income so as to reduce its cross‐sectional inequality and variability over time are 
pervasive in Europe, and are implemented at the National level within the European Union. In the 
cyclical downturn of the early 2000s, it was common for public opinion and National politicians to 
blame feelings of economic insecurity on the most novel and most apparently avoidable aspect of 
recent experience: the euro and, more generally, deeper and wider economic integration in the 
European Union (EU). 3  Assessing the theoretical and empirical basis for such concerns is arguably all 
the more important as Europe and the world enter a new phase of recession and nationalization of 
economic activity.   
This paper analyzes the implications for growth and income inequality of Stage Three of the European 
economic and monetary integration process, i.e. adoption of the euro as the single currency (EMU, 
for brevity, in what follows). Section 2 outlines how EMU may be related to inequality through 
macroeconomic channels and, especially, because of its implications for market and policy reactions 
to tight and irrevocable integration of goods and financial markets. Section 3 assesses the empirical 
association between EMU, economic performance, inequality, and social policy. Section 4 concludes 
summarizing and outlining policy implications. 
2.Income distribution, market integration, and policy 
Economic and monetary union can influence income distribution through at least three channels: 
macroeconomic policy constraints, market integration, and redistribution policy reforms.  
 
                                                 
1 See for example the papers in Baldwin, Bertola, Seabright (2003) and their references to other studies of the 
impact of EMU on a variety of structural features and economic outcomes, notably the intensity of trade.  
2 See, e.g., Spilimbergo, Londoño, and Székely (1999). 
3 Eurobarometer (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl171_en.pdf) found that top reasons 
for a ‘no’ vote to the European Constitution referendum by French citizens included ‘loss of jobs’ (31%), ‘too 
much unemployment’ (26%), ‘economically too liberal’ (19%) and ‘not enough social Europe’ (16%).  Opposition 
to the first draft of the Services directive was similarly rooted in the fear that supply of cheap, unregulated labor 
in Continental European countries would endanger their social welfare models.  
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2.1 Macroeconomic policy and inequality 
In a single‐currency area, countries cannot conduct independent monetary policies, and (intra‐area) 
exchange rates cease to affect their competitiveness vis‐à‐vis each other. To the extent that the 
Growth and Stability pact is a binding constraint, fiscal policy instruments are also less than fully 
available under EMU.  As discussed in more detail by Sapir et al. (2004), constraining macroeconomic 
policies can make it difficult to stabilise economic activity when savings and investment decisions are 
imperfectly coordinated, and prices and wages are inflexible. The same fiscal and monetary 
instruments that can be useful in that context, however, can also generate and propagate aggregate 
shocks if used in pursuit of objectives different from macroeconomic stability, and can precipitate 
crises if implemented in unsustainable ways. Monetary union has undoubtedly allowed member 
countries to achieve stability, granting previously elusive credibility to some countries, and preventing 
spill‐overs from trading partners’ unstable policies. And macroeconomic stability can foster growth, in 
that long‐horizon investment and innovation decisions are easier and better informed in a more 
predictable environment.  
Inequality can be affected by these macroeconomic aspects, in that country‐level fluctuations 
influence incomes differently across different individuals. Wage and unemployment developments 
are very important determinants of personal income inequality, and if nominal prices and wages are 
rigid foregoing devaluations may require sharper activity slowdowns, unemployment increases, and 
consumption wage reductions when it is necessary to restore competitiveness. Credibly ruling out 
devaluation options, however, may enforce wage moderation at any given level of unemployment, 
and reduce the degree of real wage rigidity implied in conditions of poor monetary policy credibility 
by anticipation on the part of wage‐setters of future devaluations.  In an integrated economic area, 
however, cyclical influences span national borders, and National macroeconomic policies are a blunt 
tool against fluctuations. When most labour market shocks occur at the regional or industry level, the 
fiscal policy independence suppressed by EMU would likely be a source rather than a remedy for 
national economic fluctuations (Darvas, Rose, and Szapáry, 2005). And as macroeconomic stability 
and tight market integration calls for wage an employment flexibility in response to sector‐ and 
regions‐level shocks, the coordinated wage bargains that proved useful in order to cope with country‐
specify adjustments to shocks may hinder the necessary adjustments, as centralization tends to 
compress wages. 
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2.2 Integration, distribution, and risk 
From this market‐oriented perspective, EMU does not only deprive its member countries of 
macroeconomic policy independence: it also opens the way to new market forces and new sources of 
shocks, as a single currency is also an extremely important step towards full integration of 
microeconomic market interactions. The absence of currency risk improves price transparency, 
reduces the extent to which price and wage stickiness may blur  relative productivity signals, and 
supports economies of scale in deeper markets for goods, services, and financial products. Wider and 
deeper market integration fosters efficiency both through such direct channels, and also by exerting 
pressure towards efficiency‐enhancing reforms, which may also be spurred by the absence of 
devaluation and other macroeconomic escape routes towards at least temporarily better 
competitiveness (Belke, Herz, and Vogel, 2007, review the relevant theoretical channels and 
evidence). 
The implications of market integration for income inequality are  ambiguous. Like any change, 
economic integration affects not only the aggregate amount but also the distribution of income and 
welfare. Diversion of trade from within to across countries’ borders can benefit some producers and 
damage others. Most intuitively, integration with poorer countries may increase inequality in rich 
countries, as their poor citizens’ incomes are bid down by competition from substitutable workers in 
poor countries. More generally, however, factors of production can be complementary rather than 
substitutable across borders.4 And factors can move or accumulate over time, in ways that influence 
patterns of production and income across countries and individuals interacting in integrated markets. 
If income is higher and returns to investment lower where more capital is available, integration 
should reduce inequality as production grows faster where it is initially low; but if production exploits 
increasing returns instead, market integration can increase income inequality.5 
The interplay between these channels implies that the inequality impact of integration is theoretically 
ambiguous overall, and amenable to empirical investigation. In practice, inequality in most advanced 
countries has been increasing since the 1970s, bringing to an end a long decline in the earlier part of 
the 20th century (see Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, for evidence on top incomes, and Atkinson, 2008, 
for evidence on earnings inequality). This pattern broadly parallels that of global economic integration 
indicators, but it is difficult to identify the effects of economic integration separately from those of 
technological change. On the one hand, because the extent of economic integration is shaped by 
                                                 
4 See O’Rourke (2001) for an overview of mechanisms and evidence. 
5 Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimueller (2006) discuss extensively the relevant interaction channels. 
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progress in transportation and communication technologies, as well as by trade liberalization and 
other policy trends. On the other hand, because the two phenomena have similar effects on the 
distribution of incomes in advanced countries. A portion of the observed increase in income 
inequality is accounted for by widening pay differentials across education levels, and may be 
explained by mechanisms whereby unskilled workers are substituted (and skilled workers 
complemented) by machines and/or by less developed countries’ labour.  
A particularly welfare‐relevant portion of income inequality, however, may reflect ex post random 
events rather than ex ante, permanent factors. The volatility of each worker’s income over his or her 
lifetime may also be related to economic integration: as more widely integrated markets react more 
promptly and more sharply to differences in prices, small cost shocks can have dramatic effects on 
production. Survey evidence indicates that perceived labour market risk is higher for workers working 
in more internationalized sectors (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004), and that, even though integration is 
expected to be beneficial on average, the average individual is against immigration and trade in most 
countries. Higher aggregate production levels are not unambiguously beneficial when markets 
(especially financial markets) are imperfect and incomplete, making it impossible to assess welfare on 
a “representative individual” basis. As integration changes the distribution of income and of 
consumption across heterogeneous agents, attitudes towards it depend on whether individual agents 
expect to find themselves above or below the average of income changes. In surveys, opposition to 
economic integration is indeed sensibly stronger on the part of individuals who are theoretically more 
likely to be damaged by it, such as low‐skilled workers in countries that receive low‐skilled migration 
inflows (see Mayda, O’Rourke, and Sinnott, 2007). 
Studies of such channels of interactions have mostly focused on economic integration between 
countries at vastly different levels of development, as in the case of North/South globalization 
patterns or of the EU’s enlargement to transition countries. Economic integration among countries 
with similar endowments, such as the original six members of what is now the European Union and 
the current Eurozone members, has often been supposed to yield mostly economies of scale and of 
variety, with little (if any) implications for within‐country income distribution. Different aspects 
coexist in all economic integration experiences, however, and there is no reason to expect any 
income‐volatility implications of economic integration to be less pronounced in the case of Eurozone 
countries than in that of more diverse, but less tightly integrated economies.  
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2.3 Redistribution policy 
Europe’s pervasive Welfare State tradition makes it particularly interesting to consider interactions 
between integration of the markets where individual agents’ decisions take place, and 
implementation of collective policies. Labour incomes are affected not only by macroeconomic and 
international market developments, but also by such features as the influence of unions in wage 
setting, unemployment insurance schemes, and employment protection legislation. When 
unemployment is induced by compression of wage differentials and subsidized then, as discussed in 
Checchi and García Peñalosa (2008), it is not a source of risk but a relatively permanent feature of 
individuals’ labour market position, and it is correlated with more equal disposable incomes at the 
household level . Bertola (2008) analyzes the relationship between labor market policy and outcomes 
and EMU inception, using methods similar to those of this paper and finding that inequality 
developments are largely accounted for by changes in unemployment and employment.  
Other collective policies are also crucially relevant to income distribution. People do not only interact 
through markets. Reducing ex ante inequality can be desirable in order to foster social cohesion, and 
redistribution policies can offset ex post income shocks when information and implementation 
problems prevent insurance markets from smoothing out their welfare impact. If imperfect and 
incomplete information does not make it possible to distinguish random events from the effects of 
individual efforts, however, then redistribution decreases production efficiency at the same time as it 
reduces the role of luck in the determination of individual welfare. 
Thus social policy, like all policies, has desirable and undesirable effects, whose relative strength 
depends on the economy’s characteristics. The impact of economic integration on its implementation 
is twofold. On the one hand, new cross‐border sources of risk may increase the appeal of policies 
meant to buffer the welfare implications of uninsurable risk, and may explain why more open 
countries’ governments are more deeply involved in economic matters. On the other hand, 
international economic integration also affects the viability of National redistribution policies. Wider, 
less constrained market interactions improve efficiency because they offer more choices to individual 
economic agents. But they also make it more difficult for policies to shape individual choices 
differently from what would be implied by unavoidably imperfect market mechanisms. Depending on 
whether demand or supply influences dominate, integration may in practice increase or decrease the 
intensity of collective redistribution and other interferences with laissez faire markets at the country 
level (Agell, 2002). Survey evidence indicates that attitudes towards economic integration are also 
shaped by their impact on redistribution policies (Mayda, O’Rourke, and Sinnott, 2007). Hence, 
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economic integration’s political sustainability may well require coordination of social policies at the 
same level as that of market interactions (Bertola, 2006).  
3.Income distribution and EMU 
The previous section’s review of theoretical insights suggests that the impact of integration on 
inequality is ambiguous overall, but plays out through well‐defined and policy‐relevant channels of 
interaction. Identifying such channels and assessing overall inequality effects is an essentially 
empirical problem.  
3.1 Data 
For a useful set of countries and periods, Eurostat publishes measures of household equivalised 
disposable income inequality.  Despite comparability and measurement problems (discussed below), 
no other data source appears comprehensive enough for this paper’s purposes. 
Two inequality indicators are available: the “quintile ratio” (i.e. the ratio of income earned by the top 
fifth of the population ranked by increasing income, to that earned by the bottom fifth); and the Gini 
coefficient, which is influenced by the overall shape of the income distribution and gives more weight 
to its middle portion. Both are increasing in the extent of inequality: the quintile ratio ranges upwards 
from unity as less income accrues to the bottom fifth of the households and more to the top fifth; the 
Gini coefficient ranges from zero to 100 as the underlying distribution goes from perfect equality to 
complete concentration.  
As shown in Figure 1, EU‐level inequality indicators follow a U‐shaped path around adoption of the 
euro. Inequality, according to both measures, was declining or constant until 2000, remained flat 
through 2001, and increased back to 1996 levels by 2002.6 Later data are based on different methods, 
and offer a mixed picture of  inequality developments until the end of the sample (the latest 
indicators displayed are those computed on the basis of data collected in 2006, and refer to 2005 
incomes).   
The U‐shaped path of inequality in Figure 1 makes a forceful case for exploring the relationship 
between EMU and inequality but, of course, many factors other than EMU drive inequality in the 
                                                 
6 The Eurostat convention is to attribute inequality data to the survey year, whatever the underlying income 
reference period: typically, “for the income reference year preceding the date of the survey“ (see 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/ilc_sm1.htm). Thus, the labels the figures (and the 
timing of covariates in the regressions below) refer to the year before the one attached to the data on the 
Eurostat website. In the working paper version of this project (Bertola, 2008) dating of inequality indicators was 
not adjusted. The results, while broadly similar, were of course different in many respects. 
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observation period. And inequality is not necessarily interesting per se: research has to assess its 
relationship to dimensions of economic performance and policy that may also be affected by EMU, 
and this will motivate attention to income and social policy in what follows.   
Another reason the dynamics of inequality indicator may motivate but not satisfy curiosity as regards 
their relationship to EMU is that Eurostat measurement methods for inequality have changed, in 
terms of both definitions and underlying data, at roughly at the same time as EMU. Between 1995 
and 2001, indicators were computed by Eurostat using the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) survey data. As the ECHP was then discontinued, from 2003 Eurostat gradually adopted the 
Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU‐SILC) methodology. Income inequality 
indicators still refer to disposable household income, the definition of which is broadly similar with a 
few exceptions.7  
Available country‐specific observations are plotted in Figure 2, with different symbols depending on 
the methodology, fur survey incomes between 1995 and 2005.8 The change in measurement 
procedure occurs at different times in different countries, and typically implies a missing observation. 
Dynamics across the methodological change are similar to those observed in other periods. In several 
cases, they follow a U‐shaped path around the turn of the millennium, and are clearly dwarfed by 
country differences in inequality levels. This makes it essential to try and control for country‐specific 
factors when assessing dynamic developments which, while apparently small, are potentially very 
important, for two reasons. First, because the aggregate efficiency effects of integration may also 
appear small: the Single Market Program was estimated in Cecchini (1988 ) to increase European GDP 
by a few percentage points, in the 2‐6% range.  Second, because they can be a reflection of more 
dramatic changes in individual circumstance. To the extent that higher inequality across individuals 
results from more pronounced instability over time of individual incomes, the associated increase in 
uninsurable consumption volatility may well be such as to more than compensate higher levels and 
                                                 
7 Income as defined in EU‐SILC includes in‐kind income from work payments made to other households and 
interest payments on loans; it also aims at including imputed rent from owner‐occupation, but this feature is 
only implemented mandatorily from 2007. Statistics for 2007 are labeled ‘provisional’ in the Eurostat database 
at the time of writing this paper, and are not used. I am grateful to Carmen Raluca Ipate, Erich Ruscher, and 
Andrea Brandolini for help in locating and assessing information on the definition and measurement aspects 
discussed at length in Eurostat (2005). 
8 Luxembourg observations are excluded: inequality indicators are very similar in Luxembourg, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands, but Luxembourg’s much higher per capita GDP and peculiar financial specialization may spuriously 
affect the regressions. 
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faster growth of consumption and income (see Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney, 2005, for a model and 
some relevant evidence).  
3.2 Patterns 
A portion of the impressive swing in Figure 1 may be accounted for by composition effects, i.e., by 
high‐inequality countries growing in importance within the aggregate at times of increasing inequality 
and vice versa. The available data are too scarce to ascertain whether any such composition effects 
may be structural. Another reason why overall EU inequality may increase is divergence of average 
income levels across countries. Figure 3 illustrates convergence patterns of country‐level average 
incomes before and after 2000 (weighting by population makes no difference to the results). The data 
clearly indicate that growth has slowed down rather uniformly after 2000 in the EU15, and that 
income convergence has all but stopped across member countries. Slower and/or more variable 
growth in the cyclical slowdown phase may or may not be affected by EMU, as both fiscal and 
monetary policy were already blunt in the after‐Maastricht run‐up to EMU when individual countries 
faced stringent exchange rate and budget constraints. Different convergence rates across EU15 
countries may have played a role in determining the dynamics of EU‐level inequality in Figure 1, and it 
will be important in what follows to account for aggregate dynamics when characterizing the 
association between EMU membership and within‐country inequality.9 
To set the stage for empirical assessment of the joint dynamics of EMU, economic performance, and 
country‐specific inequality developments, it is useful to characterize the variation across countries 
and over time of variables that are theoretically relevant to inequality. Figure 4 shows that inequality 
is negatively related to per capita income, which is positively associated with public social expenditure 
as a fraction of GDP, which is in turn negatively related to inequality. The measure of public social 
expenditure excludes old‐age and survivor benefits which, depending on pension systems, need not 
be as strongly inequality‐reducing as unemployment benefits and other transfers (the sign of partial 
associations between these variables are the same as those of bi‐variate relationships in the 
regressions in Table 4 below). It is of course unsurprising to find that generous social spending 
reduces disposable income inequality. The negative relationship between income and inequality, and 
the positive relationship between income and social spending, arguably reflect underlying structural 
factors. Taxes and subsidies may in principle perform efficiency‐enhancing roles that are beyond 
                                                 
9 Countercyclical variation in wage inequality and volatility has been documented by many authors, including 
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), mainly on American data. The regressions below assess inequality 
developments controlling for income.  
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reach of imperfectly and incompletely informed markets, but governments’ attempts to do so 
encounter the same information and incentive problems as private market participants. Thus, social 
policy improves equality at the expense of efficiency and aggregate production. As countries differ 
not only in terms of the political appeal of movements along such trade‐off but also in terms of their 
ability to produce aggregate income, countries that are better able to produce and redistribute 
income will find it easier to bear the efficiency costs of more extensive redistribution. To the extent 
that relationships between the variables of interest are jointly caused by structural and cyclical 
exogenous variation, inclusion of per capita income in the regressions below may help control for 
factors that are structurally related to inequality and inequality prevention, and not directly affected 
by economic integration. 
Data computed on the basis of different methodologies are plotted with different symbols in Figure 4. 
Definitional changes appear to be associated with a mild and parallel shift in the relationship of 
indicators to per capita income. While the relevant patterns are very similar for both inequality 
indicators (the sample correlation of Gini coefficients and income quintile ratios exceeds 0.95), the 
choice of income indicator has interesting implications. When per capita income is measured in terms 
of real 1995 euro GDP, its association with both inequality and social spending is tighter than when 
using GDP per capita in purchasing power standard, which may a priori be a better gauge of countries’ 
level of development.  
3.3 Regressions  
To help assess the quantitative relevance of the coefficients in the regressions below, Table 1 displays 
summary statistics for the relevant variables in the available sample of 11 yearly observations in 14 
countries.  The time interval covered by the data set is conveniently symmetric around adoption of 
the euro, and span a cyclical episode: including GDP in the regressions will control for cyclical 
influences on inequality and social spending, but lack of comparable data for earlier cycles makes it 
impossible to assess whether the relationship between inequality and macroeconomic conditions has 
been affected by EMU.  
To assess the relationship between the various phenomena of interest and EMU, the following tables 
report regressions on a dummy variable equal to unity in 1999 and later years for Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and in 2001 and later years for 
Greece. The coefficient of the EMU dummy will capture variation associated, for a given country and 
in comparison to countries that remain out, with adoption of the common currency. Anticipation and 
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lagged effects are important in reality, of course, but one‐year changes in the dating of the EMU=1 
observations make very little difference to the results.  
Table 2 displays simple regressions of per capita income and inequality indicators on the EMU 
dummy. In the top panel, no controls are included, so that the coefficient of EMU is the simple 
difference between the sample mean of the Eurozone countries and periods, and other observations. 
This approach gives little evidence of an association between EMU and inequality, some indication 
that adoption of the common currency was associated with more intense trade in goods (consistently 
with a large body of recent literature), and with some services and investment integration as well. 
The EMU dummy is positively associated with per capita income, particularly so for the PPS measure, 
but this is not particularly surprisingly since euro adoption occurs in the latter portion of the sample. 
In fact, these simple differences cannot disentangle the effects of EMU from those of aggregate 
growth and other synchronous developments. Since most of the countries in the sample ended up 
adopting the euro during the period considered, the association with EMU needs to be disentangled 
from that with the time of observation, and that with permanent characteristics of the countries 
considered (other than those associated with their inclination to join EMU). To this end one may 
include year effects to control for common developments, and country dummies to control for 
invariant characteristics. The second and third panel of Table 2, however, show that doing so leads to 
insignificant, imprecise, and conflicting results as regards all variables, including market integration 
indicators.  
The coincidence of EMU developments with enlargement and global cycles, the uncertain timing of 
EMU, and the very limited number of observation make it difficult to rely on mechanical statistical 
methods. But the issues are sufficiently important to warrant investigation. Many relevant 
characteristics may vary across countries and time in ways that are not captured by the same simple 
dummies that in the bottom panel of Table 2 absorb essentially all of the variation across EMU and 
non‐EMU subsamples. To assess co‐variation between inequality and EMU, regressions below will 
include GDP per capita indicators to control for factors that vary across countries and over time in 
ways that need not be captured by year and country dummies but, in light of the patterns displayed 
in Figure 4, are crucially relevant to inequality and social policy.  
In all regressions below the presence of GDP in the specification and of countries that did not adopt 
the euro in the sample controls, to the limited extent possible, for the relationship of inequality to the 
global cycle, to EU enlargement, and to other events occurring at roughly the same time as EMU. 
Some of the variation that remains after controlling for such factors may be related to EMU inception. 
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In the regressions, a dummy variable EMU0 is equal to unity throughout the available sample for all 
the countries that have adopted the single currency as of 2005, and equal to zero for the other EU15 
countries. Its coefficient assesses the relationship between the left‐hand sided variable and 
characteristics (other than those represented by income and any other covariates) that are 
permanently common to countries that eventually join EMU within the sample.  
The coefficient of the EMU dummy then captures the association between monetary union and 
inequality that is not explained by such permanent characteristics, and by country‐specific variation in 
other control variables included in the regression. It still may be influenced by events occurring over 
the period it identifies only to the extent that such events affect Eurozone countries differently from 
Denmark, Sweden, and the UK. While this comparison group is of course far from ideal, the results 
are not importantly affected by exclusion of any one of these three countries or inclusion of the few 
EFTA countries for which reasonably complete data are available.10 The results also appear robust to 
exclusion of individual countries from the EMU group. 
The regressions of Table 3 relate inequality indicators to measures of per capita income, in order to 
control for structural differences across countries and periods when assessing the relationship 
between and inequality.11 The regressions are also run with two alternative income controls, in real 
own currency terms and in purchasing power standard units. Which one is to be preferred depends 
on whether the larger inequality variation left unexplained by PPS indicators is viewed as spurious, or 
instead worthy of investigation and possibly related to economic integration. 
In columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) of the Table’s two panels, the regressions are run on all data 
(interpolating missing inequality information, and disregarding definitional changes). Regardless of 
whether inequality is measured in terms of income quintile ratios or Gini coefficients, and of whether 
real income per capita is measured in country‐specific or PPS terms, the EMU dummy is always 
positive and significant in these regressions. The coefficient of real income is very significantly 
negative, consistently with the strong relationship shown in Figure 4 above: the point estimate is the 
                                                 
10 Data for Norway (available from 1997) and for Iceland (only available in 2004‐05) make a small difference to 
the results when included in the regressions below as part of the non‐EMU control group. Inequality data are 
not available for Switzerland. Data for EU27 countries other than the EU15 and for Turkey offer interesting 
additional insights into the relationship between inequality, income, and social spending. But new member 
states’ data only begin to be available in 2000, and as of 2005 do not as yet include any Eurozone member. 
Hence, they are not useful for this paper’s purpose of assessing empirical patterns before and after EMU.  
11 Population may be included as a rough control for the likely higher heterogeneity of larger countries, and 
unemployment may also belong in the regression in light of its possibly structural relationship to inequality 
across countries and its variation across EMU inception, analyzed in Bertola (2008). When included, 
unemployment is significant, population is insignificant, and neither affects the estimates of interest. 
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same for the two measures of real income, but is less precisely estimated when the PPS indicator is 
used.  As a result, more is left to be explained by the EMU dummy, which attracts a larger and more 
significant coefficient. All results deliver qualitatively similar messages: their reliability depends on 
which measure of real income is viewed to be more strongly driven by exogenous (to EMU) factors, 
and more structurally related to inequality. The EMU0 dummy is not significant but increases the 
statistical significance of the EMU coefficient, indicating that inequality patterns may reflect 
permanent characteristic of the group of countries that eventually joined EMU as well as actual 
inception of EMU in those countries. 
The other results reported in Table 3 account for the fact that inequality indicators are compiled by 
different methods in different portions of the sample. Since the main definitional changes occur at 
specific times, they can to some extent be controlled in statistical specifications by a simple additive 
dummy equal to one if inequality is measured according to the EU‐SILC methodology, to a missing 
value if data are not published by Eurostat, and to zero otherwise (i.e., if indicators are computed and 
published on the basis of the ECHP methodology). This need not be an effective way to pool 
information from different secondary sources (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001, discuss the relevant 
issues and highlight their practical relevance). Random measurement errors in the left‐hand side 
variable of a regression, however, would only bias the estimates of interest if the effect of definitional 
change were systematically different between Eurozone and other countries, and there is little reason 
a priori to suspect this to be true. Since definitional changes certainly affected inequality indicators 
but presumably did not make them as completely incomparable as additive dummies imply, both 
these and the previous regressions convey information as to the association between EMU and 
inequality. 
In columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Table 3’s two panels, the EU‐SILC dummy allows inequality 
indicators to provide completely (if additively) different information before and after the definitional 
change, and deletes rather than interpolate missing observations. This dummy is significant and 
substantially reduces the significance of EMU coefficients, which however remain always positive and 
significantly so in regressions where the Gini coefficient is the dependent variable and real income is 
controlled in PPS terms. Other changes in the data’s information quality are more subtle. For 
example, it has been pointed out that the ECHP has over time suffered from considerable sample 
attrition (Lehmann and Wirtz, 2003). To test the robustness of results, Table A1 in the Appendix 
reports similar regressions run replacing Eurostat indicators for Germany and Italy with Gini 
coefficients computed from two internally consistent sources, the German Socio‐Economic Panel and 
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the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (the two national sources include imputed 
rent). Controlling for data sources and definitions with additive dummies, the EMU dummy is positive 
and significant in the resulting data set, especially when PPS real income is used as a control. 
The robustly positive coefficient of the EMU dummy indicates that something does differ in the 
relationship between income and inequality across observations that do and do not come from 
Eurozone countries and periods. As shown in Figure 4, social policy is strongly and intuitively 
associated with inequality. It is interesting to assess whether EMU‐related changes in the relationship 
between income and social policy are the channel through which EMU influences inequality, as this 
would confirm the theoretical insight that ever closer economic integration make it difficult for 
countries to implement uncoordinated inequality‐reducing policies.  
Table 4 regresses the share in GDP of public social expenditure (excluding pensions) on EMU dummies 
and various controls. The first three columns report simple specifications similar to those of Table 2, 
and the results similarly suggest that mechanical statistical methods would require much more 
information than is available in the sample: EMU is negatively associated to social policy, more 
significantly if country dummies are included, but the relationship disappears if both year and country 
dummies are included. Columns (4‐7) document a more structural relationship between inequality 
and social policy, controlling for the country‐ and year‐specific factors captured by per capita income 
indicators. The estimated coefficient of the EMU dummy is negative and highly significant in these 
regressions, indicating that after controlling for per‐capita income the share of GDP spent on social 
policies is lower on average in Eurozone countries after adoption of the euro than in the comparison 
group. Thus, the data deliver a clear and intriguing message: regardless of whether per capita income 
is measured in own‐currency or PPS real terms, and of whether the identity of countries that 
eventually join EMU is controlled by the EMU0 dummy, EMU accession is always negatively and 
significantly related to an indicator of social policy that is negatively related to inequality in the 
scatter plots of Figure 4. 
Since social policy indicators were not included in Table 3, their relation to economic integration 
(after controlling for per capita income) was absorbed by the coefficients of EMU in those 
regressions. Table 5 reports results from regressions that relate available inequality indicators to both 
real income and social policy, and to EMU and measurement dummies. Columns (1) and (5) of the 
table’s two panels document that both quintile ratio and Gini measures of inequality are negatively 
related to income per capita and to social policy: this completes the picture painted by the bivariate 
relationships plotted in Figure 4, telling us that in different countries and periods different inequality‐
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reducing policies may be implemented at the same level of real income, reflecting structural and 
political features of the relevant environment. The other columns of the Table explore relevance of 
EMU to the remaining variation, also allowing the EU‐SILC dummy to influence both the intercept and 
the social‐policy slope of the regressions. The coefficients of real income and social policy are 
remarkably stable across these specifications. When not only income but also social policy indicators 
are allowed to absorb part of the inequality variation associated with EMU’s timing, the coefficient of 
the EMU dummy remains positive, but is only significant when definitional changes are disregarded 
for the quintile ratio measure of inequality. In the Appendix, Table A2 reports a similar if less 
significant pattern of results for regressions where Italian and German Gini coefficients are drawn 
from national sources rather than from the Eurostat database, and definition and source dummies 
are allowed to influence the intercept and social spending slope of the regressions.  
If social policy is controlled for, the direct association between the EMU dummy and Eurostat 
inequality statistics is small and ambiguous, consistently with the similarly ambiguous implications of 
theory as regards the inequality impact of economic integration. Unemployment and employment 
variation also absorb much of the association between EMU and inequality (Bertola, 2008). In 
regressions not reported,  the share of labour income plays a similar (if less significant) alongside 
social policy expenditure: controlling for GDP per capita, the share in GDP of gross wages and salaries 
(available from Eurostat for all countries and years in the sample of interest with the exception of 
Portugal 1999‐2005) is significantly lower in EMU than in the non‐EMU subsample, and its negative 
association with inequality is significant for some measures of inequality and income. This may 
indicate that mobile capital is better able than immobile labour to take advantage of market 
integration, with personal income distribution effects as financial wealth is more unequally 
distributed than labour earnings.  
4.Concluding comments 
The evidence reported and discussed in this paper paints a picture of post‐EMU inequality evolution 
that is intriguingly consistent both with concerns expressed by citizens in Eurobarometer surveys, and 
with theoretical considerations. Economic integration’s inequality effects appear to be mediated by 
(comparatively, in comparison to pre‐EMU and non‐EMU status) less generous social policy in 
countries joining the Eurozone. The association of lower social spending and higher inequality with 
EMU’s macroeconomic policy constraints and market competitiveness concerns is consistent with the 
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obvious limitation of each country’s ability to conduct independent policies in an integrated market 
environment.  
Of course, countries were not forced by an experimenter to join EMU, but chose to do so. The choice 
was presumably influenced by the relationships detected in the data, which do imply that countries 
wishing maintain their own social policy standards were well advised not to integrate with others as 
tightly as EMU implies. Changes in the definition and measurement of inequality at times that broadly 
coincided with advent of EMU are an additional obstacle in the way of the results’ reliability for the 
purpose of assessing extremely important and topical issues.  But even if the data are treated as 
wholly incomparable before and after changes in definition, the qualitative character (if not the 
statistical significance) of the results is unchanged. The theoretically ambiguous direct impact of 
integration on inequality cannot be detected, while the data continue to support the implications of 
market and budgetary discipline for the feasibility of redistribution policies, and those of 
redistribution policies for household income inequality. 
 Like all empirical results, those reported here can be relied upon only to the extent of their statistical 
significance. But the data that do exist tell an intriguing and theoretically consistent story that has 
important policy implications. Economic integration may be politically unsustainable if it results in less 
generous inequality‐preventing independent social policies but not foster the higher productivity 
which deregulation promises when markets work well and, as higher income is associated with lower 
inequality as well as with more generous social policy, could achieve both the growth and cohesion 
objectives of European countries.  
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Data Appendix 
 
All data were downloaded from the Eurostat website in January 2009. 
Sample: 1995‐2005 annual data for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden (154 observations). See the main text and 
figures for missing and differently defined inequality indicators. No economic integration indicators are 
available before 2002 for Belgium. Moreover, the following observations of FDI flows are missing: Denmark 
in 2004, Greece in 1995‐99 and 2002‐05, Ireland 1995‐1996, and Portugal 2005. 
Variable definitions: 
 
Economic integration, Goods: imports plus exports of goods in percent of GDP. 
 
Economic integration, Services: imports plus exports of services in percent of GDP. 
 
Economic integration, FDI: inward plus outward foreign direct investment flows in percent of GDP. 
 
EMU0: dummy, equal to unity for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal.  
 
EMU: dummy, equal to unity in 1999‐2005 for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and in 2001‐2005 for Greece. 
 
EU‐SILC: dummy, equal to zero for countries and periods where Eurostat makes available the ECHP‐based 
inequality measure, to one for country and periods when the EU‐SILC measure is available, and missing 
(thus eliminating interpolated values and reducing the number of observations) when neither is available.  
GDP p.c., euro/ECU: GDP at market prices, euro/ECU thousands per inhabitant at 1995 prices. 
 
GDP p.c., PPS: GDP at market prices, Purchasing Power Standard thousands per inhabitant. 
 
Gini: Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income. 
Public Social Exp.: Social protection expenditure, all ESSPROS classifications except “old age” and “survivor” 
benefits, in percent of GDP. 
Quintile ratio: Income quintile share ratio: The ratio of total income received by the 80% of the population 
with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest 
income (lowest quintile). Income must be understood as equivalised disposable income.  
 
18 
 
REFERENCES 
Agell, Jonas (2002) “On the Determinants of Labour Market Institutions: Rent Seeking vs. Social 
Insurance,” German Economic Review 3:2 107‐135. 
Atkinson, Anthony B. (2008) The distribution of earnings in OECD countries, Oxford University Press, 
2008. 
Atkinson, Anthony B., and  Andrea Brandolini (2001) “Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of "Secondary" 
Data‐Sets: Income Inequality in OECD Countries as a Case Study” Journal of Economic 
Literature 39:3 pp. 771‐799. 
Atkinson, Anthony B. and Thomas Piketty, eds. (2007) Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: A 
Contrast Between Continental European and English‐Speaking Countries, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Baldwin, Richard, Giuseppe Bertola, and Paul Seabright eds. (2003) EMU: Assessing the impact of the 
euro, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Belke, Ansgar, Bernhard Herz, and Lukas Vogel (2007) “Reforms, Exchange Rates and Monetary 
Commitment: A Panel Analysis for OECD Countries,” Open Economies Review 18, 369–388. 
Bertola, Giuseppe (2006) “Social and Labour Market Policies in a Growing EU,” Swedish Economic 
Policy Review 13:1 189‐232. 
Bertola, Giuseppe (2008) "Economic Integration, Growth, Distribution: Does the euro make a 
difference?" in Lars Jonung and Jarmo Kontulainen (eds.), “Growth and income distribution in 
an integrated Europe: Does EMU make a difference?” Economic Papers 325, European 
Economy. 
Bertola, Giuseppe (2008) “Labour Markets in EMU: What has changed and what needs to change” 
European Economy ‐ Economic Papers 338, European Commission. 
Bertola, Giuseppe, Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn (2002) “Comparative Analysis of 
Employment Outcomes: Lessons for the United States from International Labour Market 
Evidence,” in A. Krueger and R. Solow (eds.), The Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be 
Sustained?, Russell Sage and Century Foundations, 159‐218. 
Bertola, Giuseppe, Reto Foellmi and Josef Zweimueller (2006) Income Distribution in Macroeconomic 
Models, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 440 pp. 
Cecchini, Paolo, Michael Catinat, and Alexis Jacquemin (1988) The European challenge, 1992: the 
benefits of a single market, Aldershot, Gower. 
Checchi, Daniele, and Cecilia García Peñalosa (2008) “Labour Market Institutions and the Personal 
Distribution of Income in the OECD,” Economic Policy 23:56, 601‐604. 
19 
 
Darvas, Zsolt, Andrew K. Rose and György Szapáry (2005) “Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle 
Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic,”   in Frankel, J. and C. Pissarides (eds.),  NBER 
International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2005, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press. 
Eurostat (2005) “The continuity of indicators during the transition between ECHP and EU‐SILC”, 
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Grabka, Markus M. and Joachim R. Frick (2008): The Shrinking German Middle Class—Signs of Long‐
Term Polarization in Disposable Income?. DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 4/2008, 21‐27, 
http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/84186/diw_wr_2008‐4.pdf 
Krebs, Tom, Pravin Krishna, and William Maloney (2005), “Trade Policy, Income Risk and Welfare,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Number, 11255. 
Lehmann, P.,  and C. Wirtz (2003) The EC Household Panel ‘Newsletter’ (01/02), Methods and 
Nomenclatures. Theme 3: Population and Social Conditions, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
Mayda, Anna Maria, Kevin H. O’Rourke, and Richard Sinnott (2007) “Risk, Government and 
Globalization: International Survey Evidence,” CEPR Discussion Paper 6354. 
O’Rourke, Kevin H. (2001) “Globalization and Inequality: Historical trends,” NBER WP 8339. 
Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez (2006) “The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and 
International Perspective,” American Economic Review P&P 96:2 200‐205. 
Sapir, André, Philippe Aghion,  Giuseppe Bertola, Martin Hellwig, Jean Pisani‐Ferry, Dariusz Rosati, 
José Viñals, Helen Wallace, and others (2004) An Agenda for a Growing Europe ‐ The Sapir 
Report, Oxford University Press. 
Scheve, Kenneth, and Matthew J. Slaughter (2004) “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of 
Production,” American Journal of Political Science 48:4 662‐674.  
Spilimbergo, Antonio, Juan Luis Londoño, and Miguel Székely (1999) “Income distribution, factor 
endowments, and trade openness,” Journal of Development Economics 59, 77‐101. 
Storesletten, Kjetil, Chris I. Telmer, and Amir Yaron (2004) “Cyclical Dynamics in Idiosyncratic Labour 
Market Risk,” Journal of Political Economy 112, 695–717. 
20 
 
 
 
4.
4
4.
6
4.
8
5
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
EU (15 countries) Euro area (12 countries)
Quintile share ratio ECHP
EU-SILC
year
Graphs by country
28
29
30
31
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
EU (15 countries) Euro area (12 countries)
Gini coefficient ECHP
EU-SILC
year
Graphs by country
 
Figure 1 ‐ Evolution of inequality, as measured by the income quintile ratio and Gini coefficients, in the 
EU15 and Euroarea12 aggregates (2002 is the average of data reported for 2001 and2003; methodology 
varies). 
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Figure 2 ‐ Income quintile ratios (top panel) and Gini coefficients (bottom panel) EU 15 countries, 1995‐
2005 (reference years of incomes surveyed). 
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Figure 3 ‐ Relation between initial per capita GDP and subsequent growth across EU15 countries 
(Luxembourg is excluded); horizontal axis: GDP in constant 1995 euro for the initial year of each sub‐period; 
vertical axis: growth of GDP in constant 1995 euro over the sub‐period, annual percentage points. The 
slope of the regression lines gauges the strength of inequality‐decreasing convergence forces.  
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Figure 4 – Scatter plots of per capita GDP at market prices in purchasing power standard units, per capita GDP in constant 1995 euro, income quintile ratio, Gini 
coefficient, and public social protection expenditure (ESSPROS definition, excluding old‐age pensions) as a percentage of GDP; EU15 countries (except 
Luxembourg), 1995‐2005. 
Table 1: Summary statistics. 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP p.c., euro/ECU 20.6 6.0 8.7 31.5
GDP p.c., PPS 21.4 4.3 11.0 32.3
Public Social Exp. 14.2 3.1 8.5 20.7
Quintile ratio * 4.5 1.12 2.9 7.4 
Gini * 28.8 4.6 20.0 38.0
 
*Missing values of inequality indicators are interpolated for the purpose of  
  computing these statistics 
 
Table 2: Income, inequality, and integration in and out of EMU. 
     Economic integration 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU GDP p.c., PPS Quintile ratio * Gini * Goods Services FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EMU 0.73 3.30 0.23 1.09 5.69 2.15 0.94
 0.39 2.78 0.72 0.71 2.05 1.17 1.08
N 154 154 154 154 147 147 134 
Regressions also include a constant, robust t statistics clustered by country in italics. 
 
     Economic integration 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU GDP p.c., PPS Quintile ratio * Gini * Goods Services FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EMU ‐2.97 ‐1.40 0.45 2.10 6.14 ‐0.13 ‐1.06
 ‐0.85 ‐1.16 0.67 0.67 1.23 ‐0.05 ‐0.86
N   154    154    154    154   147    147    134 
Regressions also include year dummies; Robust t statistics clustered by country in italics. 
 
     Economic integration 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU GDP p.c., PPS Quintile ratio * Gini * Goods Services FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EMU ‐0.03 0.16 ‐0.29 ‐2.24 1.19 ‐0.87 ‐0.53
 ‐0.05 0.28 ‐2.09 ‐3.29 0.83 ‐0.50 ‐0.51
N   154    154    154    154   147    147    134 
Regressions also include year and country dummies; Robust t statistics clustered by country  
in italics. 
 
*Missing values of inequality indicators are interpolated for the purpose of computing these statistics. 
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Table 3: Inequality and EMU. 
 Dependent variable: 80th‐20th income quintile share ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU    ‐0.17     ‐0.18    ‐0.18    ‐0.18           
   ‐13.20   ‐13.56   ‐15.34   ‐14.89           
GDP p.c., PPS              ‐0.17    ‐0.18     ‐0.22    ‐0.23 
              ‐3.35    ‐3.26     ‐4.74    ‐5.18 
EMU     0.35      0.46     0.12     0.20     0.80     0.87      0.51     0.70 
     2.63      3.18     0.87     1.31     2.25     3.09      1.60     3.33 
EMU0       ‐0.24      ‐0.19      ‐0.13        ‐0.38 
       ‐1.00      ‐0.96      ‐0.21        ‐0.64 
EU‐SILC            0.54     0.51          0.96     0.93 
           4.99     4.86          8.87     8.64 
N   154    154    135    135    154    154    135    135  
r2     0.83      0.83      0.87      0.87      0.38      0.38      0.50      0.51  
 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable: Gini coefficient  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU ‐0.66 ‐0.66 ‐0.67 ‐0.68   
 ‐17.67 ‐11.56 ‐14.51 ‐12.50   
GDP p.c., PPS   ‐0.64 ‐0.60 ‐0.77 ‐0.79
   ‐3.23 ‐2.93 ‐4.06 ‐4.43
EMU 1.58 1.56 0.79 0.89 3.19 2.69 2.17 2.45
 2.31 2.39 1.27 1.47 1.90 2.33 1.49 2.94
EMU0  0.04 ‐0.23 0.88  ‐0.56
  0.02 ‐0.16 0.27  ‐0.18
EU‐SILC    1.61 1.56  2.89 2.86
   2.91 3.13  5.61 5.47
N 154 154 135 135 154 154 135 135 
r2 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.32 0.32 0.40 0.40 
 
Missing values of inequality indicators are interpolated in columns 1,2, 5, 6. 
Robust t statistics accounting for country clustering in italics below the slope coefficients.  
All regressions include a constant. 
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Table 4: Public social expenditure and EMU 
 Dependent variable: Public social expenditure (excluding old age and survivor 
benefits), %GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU    0.39 0.36   
    8.18 7.20   
GDP p.c., PPS      0.36 0.27 
      3.67 2.79 
EMU ‐1.49 ‐2.90 0.16 ‐1.78 ‐1.23 ‐2.68 ‐1.51 
 ‐1.68 ‐1.91 0.38 ‐3.32 ‐2.15 ‐3.33 ‐3.10 
EMU0     ‐1.27  ‐2.07 
     ‐1.35  ‐1.24 
Year dummies  Yes Yes     
Country dummies   Yes     
N 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 
r2 0.06 0.12 0.95 0.65 0.67 0.28 0.32 
 
Robust t statistics accounting for country clustering in italics below the slope coefficients. 
Regressions without country and year dummies include a constant. 
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Table 5: Inequality, public social expenditure, and EMU. 
 Dependent variable: 80
th‐20th  income quintile share ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU ‐0.12 ‐0.13 ‐0.14 ‐0.14  
 ‐4.86 ‐4.74 ‐6.19 ‐5.28  
GDP p.c., PPS  ‐0.07 ‐0.10 ‐0.13 ‐0.15
  ‐2.84 ‐2.55 ‐4.13 ‐4.02
EMU  0.30 0.10 0.45 0.28
  2.12 0.63 1.56 1.21
EMU0  ‐0.40 ‐0.30 ‐0.72 ‐0.76
  ‐2.57 ‐2.14 ‐2.63 ‐2.99
Public Social Exp. ‐0.13 ‐0.13 ‐0.11 ‐0.12 ‐0.27 ‐0.28 ‐0.25 ‐0.26
 ‐2.78 ‐2.34 ‐2.28 ‐2.28 ‐7.37 ‐6.29 ‐6.10 ‐6.30
EU‐SILC:   
Public Social Exp. 
interaction 
 0.04 0.03  ‐0.01 ‐0.03
  1.12 0.85  ‐0.43 ‐0.82
Intercept shift  ‐0.03 0.03  1.02 1.23
  ‐0.06 0.05  2.33 2.38
N 154 154 135 135 154 154 135 135 
r2 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.86 
 
 Dependent variable: Gini coefficient 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU ‐0.42 ‐0.45 ‐0.48 ‐0.48  
 ‐4.02 ‐4.07 ‐4.63 ‐4.39  
GDP p.c., PPS  ‐0.22 ‐0.29 ‐0.38 ‐0.43
  ‐2.28 ‐1.81 ‐2.89 ‐2.81
EMU  0.84 0.38 0.94 0.72
  1.63 0.72 0.84 0.83
EMU0  ‐0.71 ‐0.77 ‐1.52 ‐2.12
  ‐0.50 ‐0.59 ‐0.83 ‐1.20
Public Social Exp. ‐0.62 ‐0.58 ‐0.55 ‐0.57 ‐1.13 ‐1.16 ‐1.03 ‐1.08
 ‐2.38 ‐2.00 ‐2.09 ‐2.01 ‐5.91 ‐4.64 ‐5.09 ‐4.79
EU‐SILC:   
Public Social Exp. 
interaction 
 0.13 0.12  ‐0.05 ‐0.10
  0.93 0.83  ‐0.40 ‐0.65
Intercept shift  ‐0.25 ‐0.28  3.10 3.75
  ‐0.12 ‐0.13  1.70 1.82
N 154 154 135 135 154 154 135 135 
r2 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.77 
 
Missing values of inequality indicators are interpolated in columns 1,2, 5, 6. 
Robust t statistics accounting for country clustering in italics below the slope coefficients.  
All regressions include a constant. 
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Appendix tables 
 
German Gini coefficients from Eurostat are replaced in these tables by 1995‐2005 annual estimates kindly 
provided by Joachim R. Frick, using the German SOEP data maintained at DIW Berlin and the definition 
documented in Grabka and Frick (2008); the GSOEP dummy variable equals unity for all Germany 
observations. The Italian Gini coefficients from Eurostat are replaced in these tables by those kindly 
estimated by Andrea Brandolini on the Bank of Italy, Survey of Household Income and Wealth data set, for  
1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006; the SHIW dummy equals unity for these years’ Italy observations, 
others are set to missing.  
 
 
 
Table A1: Inequality and EMU 
 Dependent variable: Gini coefficients
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU ‐0.67 ‐0.68   
 ‐13.23 ‐11.33   
GDP p.c., PPS   ‐0.72 ‐0.76 
   ‐3.68 ‐4.07 
EMU 1.24 1.50 2.60 2.99 
 1.94 2.30 1.77 3.34 
EMU0  ‐0.61  ‐0.79 
  ‐0.40  ‐0.25 
EU‐SILC  1.45 1.35 2.45 2.42 
 2.21 2.24 3.99 4.04 
GSOEP 2.38 2.48 ‐0.21 ‐0.08 
 3.79 3.30 ‐0.20 ‐0.07 
SHIW 2.32 2.34 5.09 5.20 
 4.88 4.92 5.22 5.05 
N 134 134 134 134 
r2 0.78 0.78 0.41 0.41 
 
Robust t statistics accounting for country clustering in italics below the slope coefficients.  
All regressions include a constant. 
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Table A2: Inequality, public social expenditure, and EMU 
 Dependent variable: Gini coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP p.c., euro/ECU ‐0.38 ‐0.41 ‐0.43    
 ‐4.11 ‐4.65 ‐4.78    
GDP p.c., PPS    ‐0.23 ‐0.33 ‐0.35 
    ‐1.79 ‐2.67 ‐2.71 
EMU 1.03 0.66 0.49 1.04 0.93 0.71 
 1.82 1.04 0.85 1.02 1.08 0.82 
EMU0 ‐0.75 ‐1.32 ‐1.02 ‐1.42 ‐2.24 ‐1.98 
 ‐0.56 ‐1.15 ‐0.85 ‐0.85 ‐1.46 ‐1.22 
Public Social Exp. ‐0.78 ‐0.79 ‐0.83 ‐1.29 ‐1.31 ‐1.37 
 ‐3.82 ‐3.73 ‐3.77 ‐7.10 ‐7.43 ‐7.38 
EU‐SILC   1.22 ‐2.54  1.77 ‐1.28 
  2.36 ‐2.64  2.79 ‐0.72 
GSOEP  2.72 ‐15.38  2.21 ‐29.14 
  4.55 ‐2.36  3.26 ‐4.07 
SHIW  ‐0.62 6.95  ‐1.46 ‐5.26 
  ‐0.81 1.11  ‐1.67 ‐0.58 
Public Social Expenditure 
interaction: 
      
EU‐SILC ind.   0.27   0.22 
   4.50   1.93 
GSOEP   1.05   1.88 
   2.53   4.01 
SHIW   ‐0.94   0.34 
   ‐1.44   0.34 
N 148 134 130 148 134 130 
r2 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.76 0.80 0.81 
 
Robust t statistics accounting for country clustering in italics below the slope coefficients.  
All regressions include a constant. 
 
